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The Creation of the American Memory  
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Michael Mishler
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Abstract
Much has been written about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
however, an element often overlooked in the history of these events is the way 
in which an official narrative of them was created in the minds of the American 
public. This paper examines how this official narrative and consequently memory 
of the bombings was formed. To do this newspaper articles were analyzed from 
the first published reports of the bombings in the American press up to recent 
stories regarding the bombings. Through the analysis of these reports it becomes 
clear that American memory of the bombings have three elements attached to 
it. The first being that Japan would not surrender, secondly the bombs saved 
lives, and finally Japan had started the war with the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
What makes these elements interesting is that each in some form or another 
was reported in the newspapers analyzed in this essay. The ultimate conclusion 
of the essay is that through various press releases and speeches Henry Stimson 
and Harry Truman were able to effectively shape the way in which Americans 
remember the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This then adds to 
the historical understanding not only of the events themselves, but also to how 
and why people remember. 
j
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History is often thought of as the study of things that have hap-
pened in the past. To do this most historians primarily rely on docu-
ments and aspects of material culture in order to come to some con-
clusion about the past. Inferences are drawn from the careful study 
and analysis of these items that remain from the past. For more re-
cent history though, an interesting problem presents itself for the 
historian, the issue of memory. When a historian studies something 
from the more recent past they are confronted with not only the 
written sources but also with the people who created the sources or 
who lived through a given time period. This forces the historian to 
confront and question whether or not a person’s memories are valid 
in terms of studying a historical event. While this debate over the 
value of memory continues, it is not the focus of this essay. Instead 
this essay follows a tributary that has come out of this debate: that 
is how memory of a particular event is created and more specifically 
how group memory or popular memory is created. This essay will 
attempt to explain how a group memory or official memory of the 
atomic bombings of Japan has been created in the United States. 
It will seek to trace the evolution of this memory from the time 
American’s became aware of the bombings up until the late 990s. 
Through this process the essay will offer ideas not only on how a 
particular memory was formed, but also offer insights as to why this 
memory was formed and held up in the public sphere. To do this 
what follows will base itself largely on newspaper articles from the 
time of the bombings up until the present.    
To begin though we must first look at the world in which the 
atomic bombs were created and used. The time period is summer of 
945, the United States and its allies have been at war with Germany 
and just concluded a peace. The United States has also been at war 
with Imperial Japan since the attack on Pearl Harbor on Decem-
ber 7, 94. Having concluded this peace the focus turned to defeat-
ing Japan and ending the war. The United States wondered whether 
its Soviet ally would enter the war with Japan and if they did when 
would they. There had been fire bombing raids on Tokyo and other 
Japanese cities since the beginning of the summer. The new Presi-
dent Truman attempted to fill the spot Roosevelt had for the past 
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twelve years. He had been thrust into a role he was not necessar-
ily prepared for and into an administration that had been operating 
largely without his direct input. This provides some background and 
context into which the bombs would be used. 
Now that some historical context has been given it is time to turn 
to the creation of the memory of the bombings. The bombs were 
dropped on Hiroshima on August sixth, 945 and on Nagasaki on 
August ninth. The American public was informed of the first bomb-
ing at the latest by August eighth 945. Most of the public probably 
heard of the bombing on August sixth with the President’s radio ad-
dress to the nation or read about it the next day in the newspapers. 
An article printed on August seventh, 945 appearing in the New 
York Times reproduces President Harry Truman’s and Secretary of 
War Henry Stimson’s announcement of the bombing of Hiroshima 
to the American public. The article begins with the President an-
nouncing that, “sixteen hours ago an American airplane dropped one 
bomb on Hiroshima, an important Japanese Army base. That bomb 
had more power than 20,000 tons of TNT… The Japanese began the 
war from the air at Pearl Harbor. They have been repaid manifold. 
And the end is not yet…” Here the American public is first in-
formed in writing of the use of a new bomb on Japan. This new bomb 
is powerful, and later they are told it harnesses the power of the atom 
and that had secretly been in development for some time. In addi-
tion it provides an initial reason as to why the bomb was used. The 
reason being Japan started the war with its surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor. Later the text states, “it was to spare the Japanese people 
from utter destruction that the ultimatum was issued at Potsdam on 
July 26… their leader promptly rejected the ultimatum… if they do 
not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, 
the like of which has never been seen on this earth.”2 It is here that 
the American public is not only given the first information on the 
use of the bomb and why it was used at all, but is also told that the 
Japanese were given a chance to surrender but their leaders chose not 
to surrender so the war will continue. These are the beginnings of the 
creation of the first official narrative of the atomic bombs and their 
use. The American public was simultaneously told of the bombing of 
Michael Mishler4
Hiroshima and that a new atomic weapon had been used. They are 
told it was because Japan started the war with the bombing of Pearl 
Harbor and because of their leader’s refusal to surrender after the 
announcement at Potsdam.
Later articles also appearing in the New York Times build on the 
general themes outlined here and add to the narrative by planting the 
seeds of creating heroes out of those who carried out the bombing 
mission on Hiroshima. In an article written by W. H. Lawrence, he 
describes the initial announcement of the use of the bomb by Gen-
eral Carl A. Spaatz. The article initially describes the vast amount of 
destruction this first bomb caused to the city of Hiroshima. It then 
describes the sequence of the bombing itself. It states, “the bomb was 
dropped at 9:5 A.M. from the Superfortress Enola Gay, piloted by 
Col. Paul W. Tibbets Jr…”3 From here the article goes onto describe 
the effects of the bombing witnessed by the crew of the Enola Gay 
and another air crew about 70 miles away. Following the descrip-
tion and testimony given by the aircrew on the effect of the blast 
and their experience dropping the bomb, there is an interesting fact 
given about the mission by Tibbets. He is quoted as saying the city 
of Hiroshima was picked as the target once he and his crew were 
over Japan.4 Most of the article covers the experience of the aircrew 
that dropped the bomb and gives a description of what they saw 
the bomb do. Further this aircrew is described as a humble group of 
men who knew what they had to do and carried out their mission. 
This is the initial picture of the bombing that the American public 
is presented. This being that the bomb was dropped on the sixth at 
9:5 A.M. and that it destroyed about sixty percent of the city of 
Hiroshima. 
The American public was made aware that a second atomic bomb 
had been dropped on Japan on August ninth. This news was reported 
by General Spaatz to the American public.  W. H. Lawrence wrote 
another article for The New York Times describing the use of a sec-
ond bomb against Japan. This article is much like the one from the 
day before except it describes the bombing of Nagasaki. This par-
ticular article describes how the Japanese media reported that the 
populace of Nagasaki was dead and that Nagasaki was chosen be-
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cause of its strategic importance as a shipping point for the Japanese 
armed forces and as an industrial center. Then the article goes on to 
detail what it calls propaganda that is put out by Japanese sources 
regarding both of the bombings. Lawrence writes, “voice broadcasts 
and wireless broadcasts aimed at North America and Europe appar-
ently were trying to establish a propaganda point that the bombings 
should be stopped.”5 He goes on to give a few examples of this but 
dismisses them. As of August ninth the American public is aware 
that two atomic bombs have been dropped on Japan and that both 
have done great damage to the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
Any ideas about the bombings being something other than good and 
necessary is assuaged by the articles disregarding of what it terms 
propaganda which called the bombings unnecessary and also crimes 
against humanity. Here I do not wish to pass judgment on the mo-
rality of bombings, but rather am attempting to show how an of-
ficial narrative was being created about the bombings in the Ameri-
can mind spearheaded by the U.S. government and reported by the 
media. They are by now also aware that the Soviet Union declared 
war on Japan the same day that the bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. 
Adding to this understanding of the bombings is another article ap-
pearing in The New York Times for date of August tenth. It describes 
a warning given by President Truman to Japan that atomic bomb-
ings will continue until they unconditionally surrender. The article 
describes Truman’s announcement with, “Truman threatened the 
Japanese tonight with obliteration by atomic bombing unless they 
surrender unconditionally… [it quotes Truman as adding] ‘If Japan 
does not surrender bombs will have to be dropped on war industries 
and, unfortunately thousands of civilian lives will be lost.’”6 More 
than just relaying the news of the President’s warning to Japan the 
article also quotes the President as saying the use of the bombs was 
to shorten the war and protect thousands of lives. It quotes Truman 
as remarking:
Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it 
against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Har-
bor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed 
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American prisoners of war, against those who have abandoned 
all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have 
used it in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of 
young Americans.7
By now the American public has a clear conception forming about 
the bombs, their use, and the destruction they have caused Japan. 
People have heard of the destruction on the radio and read about 
it in the newspapers like The New York Times. Now they are offered 
information as to why the bombs were used on Japan. These new 
and extremely powerful bombs were used according to the President 
because of the attacks on Pearl Harbor which started the war with 
the United States and because of all the Japanese acts of aggression 
during the war. Finally the public is told that these bombs were used 
to save countless thousands of lives and that they will continue to 
be used until Japan and its leaders unconditionally surrender. This 
statement is important because American’s have a direct justification 
given for the use of the bombs. They have heard the same message 
twice within a four day to five day period. The new type of bombs 
were used on a militaristic Japan that had started the War in the Pa-
cific, one who refused to surrender, who committed atrocities during 
the war, and now the public receives added information this being 
that the bombs were used to save lives. In this statement it means 
American lives the lives of American soldiers. There are no longer 
any assumptions as to why the bombs were used, it was not just be-
cause it was war time, and it was not solely because of Pearl Harbor, 
it was a combination of factors that have forced America’s hand into 
using this type of weapon. Here is the first instance of the creation 
of an official narrative of the use of the atomic bombs. This will com-
bine and coalesce with the earlier news reports describing the bomb-
ing of Hiroshima and later of Nagasaki. However, this cannot yet 
be pursued because these developments will not happen yet, but this 
will be important for the future American understandings regarding 
the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
On August 4, 945, Japan formally surrendered to the United 
States and its allies. The headline in the Chicago Tribune the next day 
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read Great War Ends! Japs Will Surrender to Gen. M’Arthur. The arti-
cle accompanying the title explains how the Japanese decided to sur-
render and what the terms of this surrender were to be. Five major 
outcomes of the surrender are listed in the document. Four of these 
that are of interest to this study are as follows: 
Emperor Hirohito accepting unconditionally the surrender 
terms proclaimed by the United States, Great Britain, and 
China at Potsdam July 26 and agreed to carry out all order of 
the supreme allied commander of forces that will occupy Ja-
pan. Secondly allied forces were ordered to cease firing and the 
Japanese government was instructed to issue similar order to 
all Japanese forces. Thirdly, General MacArthur was appointed 
supreme allied commander and the Japanese government was 
instructed to surrender formally to him at the place and time 
he designates. Fourth, President Truman announced he would 
proclaim V - J Day formally as soon as the surrender terms are 
signed by the representatives of the Japanese government and 
the allied power…8 
Also the article goes on to state that all items regarding surrender 
were met but the U.S. included a clause that would allow Emperor 
Hirohito to remain in power as a puppet figure subject to the su-
preme allied commander. These points of the surrender are impor-
tant for later issues that would arise in the American memory and 
understanding of the bombings. What is important here is to estab-
lish the terms of surrender and that they were clearly made public. 
These terms will become important in later discussions regarding the 
question of unconditional surrender and Japan’s refusal as being a 
motivating factor for the use of the atomic bombs. 
Following the conclusion of the War in the Pacific, attention 
regarding the atomic bombings of Japan was largely pushed to the 
side of the American consciousness. It was time to celebrate and 
to start rebuilding society. Other more pressing concerns presented 
themselves, things like the growing discontent between the Soviet 
Union and the United States and issues regarding the rebuilding of 
Europe and Japan. Issues and stories related to the bombings fall out 
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of the limelight of the newspapers that is until their anniversary in 
946. For now there is a semiofficial memory that has been created 
and which the American public is used to in regard to the bomb-
ings. This being that Japan brought these bombings on themselves 
through their provocation in starting the war with the attack on 
Pearl Harbor and through their refusal to meet the surrender terms 
offered at Potsdam as well as to save lives. Since the Japanese sur-
rendered so soon after the second bomb was dropped, many in the 
public assumed Japan surrendered as a result of these two bombings. 
This means that there was a general thought amongst the public that 
without the bombs the war with Japan would have continued. How-
ever, in June of 946 something interesting happens. A newspaper 
article circulates and appears to contradict the official and group 
memory that has been created of the bombings. The article reports 
that a definitive report was released by the United States Strategic 
Bombing Commission which stated that the atomic bombs did not 
cause Japan to surrender. The article quotes this commission as find-
ing, “that the Japanese government had been trying to terminate the 
war for three months when the A-bombs devastated Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in August, 945… [and] the report states that the Japa-
nese surrender was hastened but cannot be attributed to the atomic 
bomb.”9 This article is important to understand the creation of the 
memory of the bombings because in certain respects it contradicts 
the official narrative and group memory that have been created in 
the mind of the U.S. public. This being that the bombs were used to 
bring an end to war in which Japan would not surrender. The article 
is interesting in that one government agency not only challenges the 
popular understanding of why the bombs were used but also the offi-
cial reasons given by the President and then Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson. This article was the earliest and the first in a long line of 
those that would challenge the popular understanding and official 
narrative about the bombings. 
In order to add credence to the official narrative, Truman and 
Stimson went public yet again on the use of the bombs and why they 
decided to make use of them. This was in part due to the increas-
ing number of articles that began criticizing the bombing in late 
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946 and into 947. The official narrative given during the war by 
the government was being to have holes poked in it by government 
commissions like the Strategic Bombing Survey but also by scien-
tists and other high ranking officials who worked on or were in some 
way related to the creation of the atomic bombs. It is now that the 
strong official narrative emerges, this is the one that has pervaded the 
minds of U.S. population and it continues up through the present. 
This is the so called “saving lives narrative”. It emerged in the winter 
of 947 when both Henry Stimson and Harry Truman released joint 
statements on the decision to use the atomic bombs on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki. Stimson revealed in Harper’s Magazine in January of 
947 that, “military leaders were convinced that unless atomic bombs 
were used, major fighting would not end before late in 946 ‘at the 
earliest’ with an expected cost of more than one million casualties 
to American forces alone.”0 Further he is quoted in another article 
reporting on the same story that, “the military use of atomic energy 
was connected with larger questions of national policy”… and also 
that the decision to use it had the whole-hearted support of seven 
of the country’s top scientists, who had served as members of the 
advisory committees to determine policy.” Here Stimson and Tru-
man are attempting to resurrect their earlier attempts at creating an 
official memory regarding the decision to use the atomic bombs. 
Stimson expands on the earlier theme of saving lives as introduced 
by Truman and states that the bombs were used to save at least one 
million lives. Stimson also defends and expands the official narra-
tive through his assertion that despite what was written regarding 
scientists being displeased and arguing against the use of the bombs 
they were in fact wholly for their use. He also adds to the idea that 
the bombs brought a quick end to the war despite official findings to 
the contrary in asserting that without the bombs the war would have 
dragged on well into 946 and perhaps beyond. Stimson is also quick 
to dismiss the idea that certain scientists wanted to show the Japa-
nese the power the bombs by testing a bomb on a deserted island in 
their presence. Stimson says a number of scientists were against this 
idea from the beginning despite its proposal. Truman is quoted as 
writing, “the final decision [to use the atomic bomb] had to be made 
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by the President, and it was made after a completer survey of the 
situation, had been made… The Japanese were given fair warning… 
well in advance of the dropping of the bomb. I imagine the bomb 
caused them to accept the terms.”2 Truman for his part builds on 
the narrative as established by Stimson and also is sure to state that, 
of course, the bombs brought an end to the war and also that Ja-
pan had its chance to surrender but chose not to and so brought the 
bombings upon themselves. This is the basic official narrative that 
had been created out of the original narrative that had come under 
scrutiny in 946 and 947. This narrative being that Japan brought 
the bombings upon themselves in that they started the war, the use 
of the bombs was never questioned and were used to save at least a 
million American lives, and that they brought the end to a war in 
which Japan refused to surrender which otherwise would have con-
tinued well on into the future. 
This narrative is defended by the President again later the same 
year in August of 947. This took place during a speech to com-
memorate the two-year anniversary of V. J. Day. Largely this was due 
to continued thoughts after the war concerning whether or not the 
bombs actually needed to be used. Truman for his part sticks to the 
narrative that had been established in full earlier in the year. The ar-
ticle describes him as stating, 
He never entertained any doubts as to the wisdom of that de-
cision [to use the bombs]… he had given the matter long and 
prayerful study before reaching a decision. He believes now as 
then that the action was necessary to save the lives of 250,000 
young American’s that otherwise would have been lost on the 
invasion beaches.3 
There is a slight alteration to the official narrative in that Tru-
man claims the number of lives saved by the bombs was 250,000 as 
opposed to a million but here the difference is negligible because in 
either case it is such a large amount of lives as to render the exact 
details meaningless.
This is the narrative that would enter the popular mind and be 
reinforced not only by the President and Stimson but also by Ameri-
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can history textbooks well into the future and even up to the present. 
It is the narrative that has shaped and become the popular American 
memory of the bombings. 
Now that the official narrative and memory has been established 
we can begin to trace how a group memory emerged from it, the 
forms it has taken since its establishment, and why it remains so 
prevalent in American minds. Here the focus will be on how this 
official memory became the popular memory of the bombings in the 
American mind and will seek to show this in practical as well as in 
theoretical terms. The main way in which this official narrative has 
become the group memory of these events in the United States is 
through their official proclamation and repetition within the histori-
cal tradition of the United States. From popular reading to primary 
and secondary education textbooks a certain understanding of the 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is expressed. This meaning or 
understanding is expressed again and again no matter where a per-
son turns. This understanding of the bombings is the one that was 
given by Stimson and Truman in January of 947. It is constantly 
repeated in textbooks, on T.V., in movies, newspapers and maga-
zines, and, of course on the Internet. Largely this has created a sort 
of self-informing cycle in which the official narrative in some form 
or another is repeated to a populace that expects to hear just this 
narrative. In this way not only does this narrative become solidified 
in the minds of Americans, it also becomes something that is almost 
glorified because added to this understanding is the idea that we (the 
United States) were fighting the good war for ideals like democracy 
and peace. Here I do not wish to question the intent of the leaders 
during the war nor do I want to enter into a debate regarding the 
morality of war or anything of this nature. Instead what I am at-
tempting to establish is that the American public brings a general 
conception and viewpoint to their understanding of the War in the 
Pacific. This is that America was forced into a war with Japan be-
cause of their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Further they chose to 
fight to the bitter end despite the United States offering them a way 
to surrender. Because of this and other issues as outlined in the of-
ficial narrative the U.S. had to use the atomic bombs. In a sense there 
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is a sort of implicit teleology that is brought to the general public’s 
understanding of the bombings. 
These ideas are evidenced clearly when in people’s letters to the 
editor. Most often these come on the anniversary of the bombings 
in August and are often in response to Japanese festivities promoting 
peace or suggesting that the bombings were immoral in nature. It is 
in these writings that one can witness the pervasive nature the of-
ficial narrative has had on the popular memory of these events in the 
American mind. One article that illustrates these ideas well comes 
from the December 3, 982 edition of the Chicago Tribune. In a let-
ter printed in the section titled “Voice of the People”, Mario Caruso, 
Jr. is quick to repeat the official narrative with some added commen-
tary. He writes, 
Every year on August 4 we are made to feel guilty for drop-
ping the atom bomb on Japan… however, on Dec 7, 94 we 
suffered the unprovoked attack by the Japanese on Pearl Har-
bor… we also have been hearing that the Japanese recently 
have been rewriting their history books, apparently to cover up 
their atrocities and the fact that they were the aggressors. Are 
we to feel guilty for dropping the atom bomb on Japan to end 
the war they got us into in the first place? It seems to me that 
the Japanese should bear the guilt of the want and the bomb 
itself.4
Here the reader is presented with some key elements of the of-
ficial narrative; these elements have managed to become part of the 
popular memory of the event. These elements are: the reference to 
Pearl Harbor, Japan started the war; the bomb(s) ended the war. 
Here are three key pieces of the official narrative put forth by Stim-
son and Truman in 947 that have through repetition in textbooks, 
on T.V., in movies, newspapers and magazines made their way into 
the popular memory of the bombings in the United States. 
An equally informing view similar to this one comes again from 
the Chicago Tribune, this time from a Ruth Martens writing in 977. 
She writes, “I cannot help thinking of the victims who have suffered 
in silence as a result of the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor… the atomic 
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bombing of Hiroshima would never had taken place if the bombing 
of Pearl Harbor had not occurred.”5 Here again one can see the in-
fluence of the official narrative in her assertion that without Pearl 
Harbor the bombing of Hiroshima would never have happened nor 
needed to happen. One final example of the influence of the offi-
cial narrative coming to shape the popular narrative can be seen in a 
longer piece published in the Chicago Tribune. This comes from Bob 
Wiedrich and was printed in August of 982. He writes, “Harry Tru-
man was right on target when he ordered the atomic bombs dropped 
on Japan… his action was dictated by the estimated million casu-
alties the allies were expected to suffer in an invasion of the Japa-
nese homeland…”6 Further he adds a new twist to the memory and 
narrative in claiming that the Japanese had planned and attempted 
to infect the United States with bubonic plague by sending infected 
rats over in balloons. Here again the official narrative is clearly ev-
ident. He makes reference to the saving of a million lives because 
with the use of the bombs an invasion was not necessary. Further he 
implicitly promotes the idea that the atomic bombs brought an end 
to the War in the Pacific. Finally, there is the twist he adds, which is 
to paint the Japanese as perpetrators of atrocities though this time 
in the form of using biological weapons. This understanding is not 
merely limited to the average citizen or just to veterans of the war. It 
has a much wider base and appeal within the populace. The popular-
ity even remains in the academic community and is not strictly lim-
ited to the military schools of the United States. 
In the introduction of his book, Weapons for Victory, Robert Mad-
dox criticizes scholars who have written revisionist histories regard-
ing the atomic bombings and the decision to make use of the atomic 
bombs. In his introduction he writes, “The present volume offers in-
terpretation of the events leading up to Hiroshima and Nagasaki… 
along the way I have pointed out some of the more blatant revision-
ist distortions such as those already mention…”7 These revisionist 
theories are based off of evidence like the conflicting reports cited 
earlier and the tracing of the emergence of the official narrative put 
forth by Stimson and Truman in 947. Throughout the rest of the 
book let alone the introduction, Maddox presents the official narra-
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tive as retold in 995 in an attempt to defend against scholars who 
have come to a different understanding of the atomic bombings. This 
work and the years of 994 and 995 lead into an important time in 
the process of creation of the popular memory of the atomic bomb-
ings. This refers to the now infamous Enola Gay Exhibit and contro-
versy at the Air and National Space Museum. 
To understand the significance of this major controversy a little 
background needs to be given in regard to the planned exhibit. In 
994 an idea was brought up for an exhibit to commemorate the 
fiftieth anniversary of the end of the War in the Pacific. This was to 
be an exhibit held at the Air and National Space Museum in Wash-
ington, D.C. The exhibit itself would specifically focus on the Enola 
Gay and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From 
the beginning though the project more than anything else engen-
dered controversy. The historians selected to make up the crew for 
the project could not agree from the beginning on key areas of what 
the exhibit was to do and be like. One member of the design team, 
Martin Sherwin has written a few articles regarding his participa-
tion in the project and the problems that were encountered along 
the way. The way the original exhibit was planned left him feeling 
quite uneasy about what was being proposed. He makes the follow-
ing comment, “I judged the commemorative character of the exhibit 
dominant and ubiquitous, and the historical portion marginalized 
and unappealing…”8 He felt this way because in his mind the pro-
posed exhibit would tell the history of the decision to use the bomb 
through a limited number of documents hung on the wall near the 
fuselage of the Enola Gay. Further, other objects included like ar-
tifacts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki in the original plan did little 
to challenge people to think and understand why Truman, Stimson, 
Byrnes and others came to the decision they did.9 
To Sherwin the exhibit was more about presenting a certain idea 
and show and glitz and not about history. However, he was over 
ruled by other advisors like the historians from the United States Air 
Force, Dr. Richard Hallion and Dr. Herman Wolk, who in the words 
of Sherwin staunchly defended the proposed script. These two men 
understood the history and had done their research but took a very 
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cautious approach to the exhibit. They were commended by some 
like Edwin Bearss, a historian for the National Park Service and vet-
eran of the Second World War. However, others like John T. Cor-
rell the editor of Air Force Magazine felt the exhibit was, “it not only 
suffered from too much of the PC… Correll considered the exhibit 
biased against the air force, pro-Japanese, and anti –American”, and 
he wrote an article condemning the exhibit.20 This sparked off even 
more public criticism of the exhibit which was only in the planning 
stages. A series of articles came out questioning or condemning the 
exhibit in its current from usually making claims that the exhibit was 
unpatriotic or untrue to history. Things got so bad after the print-
ing of Correl’s article and others like it that the American Legion, 
“enlisted congressional allies... Senators and congressmen rushed to 
condemn the exhibit… Sen. Nancy Kassebaum offered a resolution 
in the Senate, and dozens of congressmen signed letters that threat-
ened retribution against the staff of the museum if the script was not 
modified to the satisfaction of its critics.”2 These changes demanded 
by the senate and congress were to add more to the exhibit explain-
ing Japanese wartime atrocities like its invasion of China and the 
Nanking massacre and the removal of all documents that were criti-
cal of the use of nuclear weapons. The American Legion wanted a 
statement removed that questioned whether or not the bombs really 
were necessary to bring the war to a quick conclusion.22 There were 
also a flurry of newspaper articles that covered this unfolding drama 
and debacle. Most of the articles track the changes to the exhibit 
brought on by all the controversy surrounding the original and then 
amended plans for the exhibit. One article on the topic states, 
at one pole speculative estimates of how many Americans 
would have died invading Japan, and were presumably spared 
because of the bombing, and at the other whether the attack 
in August 945 was necessary to end the war… some histori-
ans now contend the bombing was not aimed at wartime en-
emy Japan as at the wartime ally the Soviet Union… in the 
latest clash the Smithsonian Institution, attacked by veterans 
and groups and members of Congress for a World War II ex-
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hibit that they said was overly solicitous of Japan, has decided 
to drastically scale back the display: The narrative already re-
vised five times, will be dropped, and visitors will se only part 
of the Enola Gay’s fuselage, along with a small commemora-
tive plaque.23 
This sums up much of the coverage and debate about the exhibit 
at the Smithsonian. What this quote and the information pulled 
from the Sherwin article illustrates is the extent to which the offi-
cial narrative had by the years of 994 and 995 become the popular 
memory of the atomic bombings. This is not to say that there were 
not detractors or those who did not question the way the bombings 
were remembered. There were a number of scholars and historians 
who by the 990s did question the popular memory—these being 
people like Sherwin, Michael J. Hogan, Barton J. Bernstein, John W. 
Dower, Gar Alpervitz, as well as others. Nevertheless the controversy 
and heated reactions towards the exhibit illustrate just how deeply 
ingrained the popular memory of the bombings was in the mind of 
the American public. The initial display may not have been histori-
cally challenging enough for someone like Sherwin but it was also 
not unpatriotic. However, the public and members of the Senate and 
Congress could not begin to handle the idea that there would be 
any other way to remember the bombings than what had been pro-
vided to them in the official narrative. They chose to believe this even 
if certain historians like Alpervitz and Bernstein and other scholars 
wrote histories offering different conclusions and understandings of 
the bombings. 
The controversy caused by the exhibit brings us to the question 
of why the official narrative which has become the popular mem-
ory of bombings has remained so strong despite more and more 
historical works being written that either challenge this memory or 
claim that it is a created product that leaves out vital information. 
One reason can be that these works while being discussed in the 
scholarly community and in academia in general fail in large part 
to reach the public. First and foremost many of the studies that 
question the motivations for using the bombs and subsequently the 
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memory of the bombings and the official narrative are aimed first 
at an academic audience. Typically these works have been written 
by specialist historians and this work has been discussed and de-
bated amongst their colleagues. A factor playing into this is that 
these studies did not come out until well after the official narrative 
had time to sink into the public consciousness and psyche. The first 
of the works challenging the popular memory and official narrative 
was not published until 96. This was Herbert Feise’s work, which 
largely endorsed the findings of the Strategic Bombing Commis-
sion. The next scholarly work that came out was Gar Alperovitz’s 
Atomic Diplomacy published in 965. These studies came out four-
teen and eighteen years after Truman and Stimson had created 
the official narrative in their announcements in Harper’s in 947. 
The public was offered no alternative for almost twenty years. For 
twenty years children were taught more or less the official narrative 
and this became the memory of the bombings for Americans. There 
was no further discussion of the findings of the Strategic Bombing 
Commission because Truman and Stimson had released their joint 
statement which effectively made the earlier findings of that com-
mission null and void.
 Another aspect playing into all this was the climate of the Cold 
War. Up until the debate over the Enola Gay exhibit the United 
States and its citizens were living under the Cold War, a world in 
which nuclear annihilation or the threat of it loomed heavy around 
every corner. The United States was painted as a bastion of democ-
racy and freedom during this time which was in contrast to the So-
viet Union. People needed stories and understandings of events that 
would confirm and even play up this understanding and conception 
of themselves. How could a nation possess such a vast amount of 
nuclear weapons as the United States did during the Cold War and 
question itself on its use of them in the past? It makes sense people 
would cling to an official version of events in a world were the only 
certain thing people could believe in was that their country was do-
ing the right thing. Overall there was not a widespread atmosphere 
conducive to questioning U.S. policy or actions especially in some-
thing that had been remembered as the “good war”. 
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Other explanations for this phenomenon come from J. Samuel 
Walker. In his article, “History, Collective Memory, and the Bomb” 
explains why there is this disjuncture between history and memory 
regarding the use of the atomic bombs. He quotes David Lowenthal 
who states, “[there are] three basic sources of public perceptions of 
the past- history, memory, and relics…”24 Currently there are fewer 
and fewer people around who remember Hiroshima, and even those 
who are around do not necessarily have a detailed or full picture of 
the event. In this respect their memory can become distorted and 
they can mix and match memory and history coming to conclusions 
that are informed by each and then represented later as memory. In 
doing this these people do not so much contribute to an increased 
level of understanding of these events, but rather recreate official 
stories and intermix memory and history. Since there are few relics 
easily accessible to the public and because the memories of the few 
people who were actually around for the bombing have been dis-
torted and altered with time, history is the only thing that is left. 
This history that most people know and go by though is what they 
are taught in grade school but especially in high school. Lowenthal 
quotes Frances FitzGerald as saying, “the history that those students 
learn is often the version of events that will stay with them for the 
rest of their lives… long after the facts have been forgotten, gen-
eral impressions remain… what stick to memory from those texts is 
not any particular series of facts, but an atmosphere, an impression, a 
tone.”25 This tone or memory comes from the textbooks the students 
use. It informs and sets their understanding of the past even if they 
forget some of the details. It is because of this particular function 
and aspect that the official narrative has been able to impress itself so 
deeply on the American mind. School textbooks have taught the of-
ficial theory for some many years and until recently have continued 
to do so. 
This has created a tone or impression on the memory of the 
American public which views the bombings and the decision to go 
forward with them in light of what they learned in high school. This 
tone or impression then informs their understanding of the past for 
the rest of their lives. It becomes a sort of filter through which peo-
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ple take in information about the past, judge this information and 
either make it conform to their tone or disregard it. This is likely 
what has happened in order to create the popular understanding or 
group memory of the bombings that is commonly held today within 
the United States. The process and cycle described thus far continues 
to go on. The official narrative is put forth in various books, maga-
zines, films, and other forms of media. Few question what they be-
lieve or their memory because they have no reason to do so. Unless 
this impression is directly challenged by competing information it 
is the memory people will stick with because it is comfortable, it is 
what they know, it in some respects makes them feel safe and gives 
order to their world. What we are left with is an issue that is still 
hotly debated today both in and out of academic circles. The United 
States and its people are still dealing with the legacy of the bomb-
ings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki some sixty two years after the fact. 
The preceding has not been an attempt to pass some sort of moral 
judgment on the bombings or those who decided to use them. In-
stead the goal has been to show how the popular, group, or collec-
tive memory of this event has been created and the reasons for its 
remaining so strong in the public mind. To do this I have relied in 
large part on newspaper articles describing the events which have 
been used to create the chronology of the formation of the memory. 
This has been supplemented and expanded by secondary sources of-
fering a mix of practical and theoretical reasons as to how and why 
this memory was created and remains so strong. 
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